Competition and Consumer Amendment (Competition Policy Review) Bill 2016
Exposure Draft
The Exposure Draft Bill
Treasury is conducting a consultation on the Exposure Draft Bill relating to the recommendations made by the Harper Panel in 2015. The Exposure Draft bill was released on 5 September 2016 and consultation closes on 30 September 2016.
Note that consultation on all aspects of the Bill, other than misuse of market power, has been extended until 28 October.
The Treasury website notes that the draft includes:
... amendments to the misuse of power provision, as well as a significant number of other important amendments to the CCA which were supported by the Government, including:
- broadening the definition of ‘competition’ to include potential imports of goods and services, to fully reflect the range of competitive pressures facing Australian firms;
- confining the cartel conduct provisions to apply to conduct affecting Australian trade or commerce, and broadening the exceptions for joint ventures and vertical trading restrictions to apply to common, pro-competitive business arrangements;
- amending the National Access Regime declaration criteria to ensure third-party access is only mandated where it is in the public interest;
- consolidating the various authorisation processes into a single, streamlined process; and
- simplifying the CCA by repealing separate, specific prohibitions on price signalling and exclusionary provisions, and introducing a prohibition against concerted practices.
See also my blog post discussing the proposed changes
I have also prepared a mark-up (both clean and with mark-up showing) of the proposed amendments:
Contents of the Exposure Draft Bill
The Exposure Draft Bill is broken down into the following schedules:
- Definition of competition
- Cartels
- Price signalling and concerted practices
- Exclusionary provisions
- Covenants affecting competition
- Secondary boycotts
- Misuse of market power
- Third line forcing
- Resale price maintenance
- Authorisations, notifications and class exemptions
- Admissions of fact
- Power to obtain information, documents and evidence
- Access to services
Detail on each forthcoming - see comparison with recommendations, below, for further details.
Misuse of market power
The exposure draft proposes repealing the current provision and replacing it with the following:
46 Misuse of market power
(1) A corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a market must not engage in conduct that has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition in that or any other market.(2) Without limiting the matters to which regard may be had in determining for the purposes of subsection (1) whether conduct has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition in a market, regard must be had to the extent to which:
(a) the conduct has the purpose of, or has or would be likely to have the effect of, increasing competition in that market, including by enhancing efficiency, innovation, product quality or price competiveness in that market; and
(b) the conduct has the purpose of, or has or would be likely to have the effect of, lessening competition in that market, including by preventing, restricting, or deterring the potential for competitive conduct or new entry into that market.
...
Comparison with recommendations
I will provide a comparison of the proposed law with the recommendations and existing law progressively. They include:
- Definition of competition
- Cartels
- Exclusionary provisions
- Price signalling and concerted practices
- Misuse of Market Power
- Third line forcing
- Exclusive Dealing
- Resale Price Maintenance
- Mergers
- Authorisation and notification
- Block exemption
- Private actions
- Access regime
- Power to obtain information, documents and evidence
- Secondary boycotts
- Simplification (covenants)
See also comparison of Harper Recommendations and Government Response and the model laws proposed in the Harper Report.
Definition of market and competition
Harper Recommendation 25 |
Exposure Draft Bill |
The current definition of ‘market’ in section 4E of the CCA should be retained but the current definition of ‘competition’ in section 4 should be amended to ensure that competition in Australian markets includes competition from goods imported or capable of being imported, or from services rendered or capable of being rendered, by persons not resident or not carrying on business in Australia. Model legislative provision:
|
Current definition of competition in s 4(1) repealed and substituted with: 'competition includes: This mirrors the model provision/definition proposed in the Harper Report. |
Comparison of new law and current law (EM page 6) |
|
Current law |
New law |
'Competition includes goods and services that are imported.' |
'Competition expressly includes goods and services that are capable of being imported, in addition to goods and services that are imported' |
Cartel conduct prohibition
Harper Recommendation 27 |
Exposure Draft Bill |
The prohibitions against cartel conduct in Part IV, Division 1 of the CCA should be simplified and the following specific changes made:
This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. |
In subsection 6(2)(C) omitted 'likely and production have' and substitute 'production has'. Repealed definition of likely in s 44ZZRB. It is now not a defined term. Output restrictions Add at the end of s 44ZZRD(3)(a) (dealing with output restrictions):
This is designed to address any gap following the proposed repeal of the separate exclusionary provision prohibition. Trade or commerce In ss 44ZZRD insert references to 'in trade or commerce' (various) and insert after 44ZZRD(4)(h)
This is designed to restrict cartel laws to conduct occurring int rade or commerce within Australia or between Australia and other places. Joint ventures The exposure draft legislation broadens the joint venture exemption to include arrangements or understandings as well as contracts and extends it to cover acquisitions of goods or services. Vertical trading restrictions The exception for vertical trading restrictions has been broadened to apply to a variety of vertical trading restrictions and not just exclusive dealing. |
Comparison of new law and current law (EM page 11) |
|
Current law |
New law |
'The cartel conduct provisions are not expressly confined to cartel conduct affecting competition in Australian markets.' |
'The cartel conduct provisions apply to cartel conduct occurring in trade or commerce within Australia, or between Australia and places outside Australia.' |
'‘Likely’ is a defined term.' |
'‘Likely’ is not a defined term.' |
'The joint venture exception applies only to contracts.' |
'The joint venture exception applies to contracts, arrangements or understandings.' |
'The joint venture exception applies to cartel provisions that are for the purposes of a joint venture.' |
'The joint venture exception applies to cartel provisions that are for the purposes of a joint venture or reasonably necessary for undertaking a joint venture.' |
'The joint venture exception applies to joint ventures for the production and/or supply of goods or services.' |
'The joint venture exception applies to joint ventures for the production, supply or acquisition of goods or services.' |
'The exception for vertical trading restrictions applies only to exclusive dealing.' |
'The exception for vertical trading restrictions applies to a broad range of vertical trading restrictions.' |
'The ‘output restriction’ purpose condition refers to production, capacity and supply.' |
'The ‘output restriction’ purpose condition refers to production, capacity, supply and acquisition.' |
Exclusionary provisions
Harper Recommendation 28 |
Exposure Draft Bill |
The CCA should be amended to remove the prohibition of exclusionary provisions in subparagraphs 45(2)(a)(i) and 45(2)(b)(i), with an amendment to the definition of cartel conduct to address any resulting gap in the law. This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. |
Sections 4D and 76C repealed Sub-sections 45(1)-(3) repealed and replaced. New section 45 does not prohibited entering into contracts, arrangements or understandings containing exclusionary provisions. Amendment to cartel conduct (above) designed to fill resulting gap). In particular, at the end of s 44ZZRD(3)(a) (dealing with output restrictions) the following is added:
|
Comparison of new law and current law (EM pages 19 and 24) |
|
Current law |
New law |
'There is no separate prohibition on exclusionary provisions within contracts, arrangements or understandings.' |
'There is a separate prohibition on exclusionary provisions within contracts, arrangements or understandings.' |
'‘Exclusionary provision’ is defined in the Act.' |
'‘Exclusionary provision’ is not defined in the Act.' |
'There is a defence to the prohibition against exclusionary provisions.' |
'There is no provision containing a defence as there is no longer a separate prohibition on exclusionary provisions.' |
Price signalling and concerted practices
Harper recommendation 29 |
Response |
The ‘price signalling’ provisions of Part IV, Division 1A of the CCA are not fit for purpose in their current form and should be repealed. Section 45 should be extended to prohibit a person engaging in a concerted practice with one or more other persons that has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition. This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. |
Price signalling (Division 1A of Part IV) repealed Section 45 extended to price signalling - s 45 now provides:
Notably concerted practice is not defined. |
Comparison of new law and current law (EM page 19) |
|
Current law |
New law |
'The anti-competitive disclosure of pricing and other information is dealt with under the more general prohibitions in the competition law.' |
'The anti-competitive disclosure of pricing and other information is dealt with under the more general prohibitions in the competition law.' |
'A corporation is prohibited from engaging in a concerted practice that has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition.' |
'No equivalent.' |
Misuse of market power
Harper Recommendation 30 |
Exposure Draft Bill |
The primary prohibition in section 46 of the CCA should be re-framed to prohibit a corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a market from engaging in conduct if the proposed conduct has the purpose, or would have or be likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition in that or any other market. To mitigate concerns about inadvertently capturing pro-competitive conduct, the legislation should direct the court, when determining whether conduct has the purpose, effect or likely effect, of substantially lessening competition in a market, to have regard to:
Such a re-framing would allow the provision to be simplified. Amendments introduced since 2007 would be unnecessary and could be repealed. These include specific provisions prohibiting predatory pricing, and amendments clarifying the meaning of ‘take advantage’ and how the causal link between the substantial degree of market power and anti-competitive purpose may be determined. Authorisation should be available in relation to section 46, and the ACCC should issue guidelines regarding its approach to the provision. This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. |
Effects test introduced - section 46 repealed and replaced with: 46 Misuse of market power (2) Without limiting the matters to which regard may be had in determining for the purposes of subsection (1) whether conduct has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition in a market, regard must be had to the extent to which:
... The Bill now also provides for authorisation of conduct which would otherwise contravene s 46. Specific prohibition on predatory pricing (Birdsville amendment) repealed) |
Comparison of new law and current law (EM page 36) |
|
Current law |
New law |
'The conduct must ‘take advantage’ of market power.' |
'The conduct must have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in that or any other market.' |
'Conduct must be for a specific anti-competitive purpose, relating to damaging an actual or potential competitor.' |
'The conduct must have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in that or any other market.' |
'Predatory pricing and other forms of conduct are expressly prohibited.' |
'There is a general provision only, and no specific prohibition on predatory pricing or other forms of conduct (however described).' |
'Authorisation is not available for section 46.' |
'A person may seek exemption from section 46 via the Commission authorisation process.' |
'‘Substantial lessening of competition’ is not an element of section 46.' |
'Certain pro-competitive and anti-competitive factors must be taken into account when considering a substantial lessening of competition.' |
Third line forcing
Harper Recommendation 32 |
Exposure Draft Bill |
Third-line forcing (subsections 47(6) and (7) of the CCA) should only be prohibited where it has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition. |
Per se prohibition removed - subjected to competition test |
Comparison of new law and current law (EM page 42) |
|
Current law |
New law |
'Third line forcing is prohibited on a per se basis.' |
'Third line forcing is prohibited only where it has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition.' |
Exclusive dealing
Harper Recommendation 33 |
Exposure Draft Bill |
Section 47 of the CCA should be repealed and vertical restrictions (including third-line forcing) and associated refusals to supply addressed by sections 45 and 46 (as amended in accordance with Recommendation 30). |
No change other than to third line forcing |
Resale price maintenance
Harper Recommendation 34 |
Exposure Draft Bill |
The prohibition on resale price maintenance (RPM) in section 48 of the CCA should be retained in its current form as a per se prohibition, but notification should be available for RPM conduct. This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. The prohibition should also be amended to include an exemption for RPM conduct between related bodies corporate, as is the case under sections 45 and 47. |
Notification available for RPM Conduct between related bodies corporate no longer constitutes engaging in RPM. |
Comparison of new law and current law (EM page 42) |
|
Current law |
New law |
'Notification is not available for RPM.' |
'A corporation or other person may notify the Commission of RPM.' |
'Acts between related bodies corporate may constitute engaging in RPM.' |
'Actions between related bodies corporate do not constitute engaging in RPM.' |
Mergers
Harper Recommendation 35 |
Exposure Draft Bill |
There should be further consultation between the ACCC and business representatives with the objective of delivering more timely decisions in the informal merger review process. The formal merger exemption processes (i.e., the formal merger clearance process and the merger authorisation process) should be combined and reformed to remove unnecessary restrictions and requirements that may have deterred their use. The specific features of the review process should be settled in consultation with business, competition law practitioners and the ACCC. However, the general framework should contain the following elements:
Merger review processes and analysis would also be improved by implementing a program of post-merger evaluations, looking back on a number of past merger decisions to determine whether the ACCC’s processes were effective and its assessments borne out by events. This function could be performed by the Australian Council for Competition Policy (see Recommendation 44). |
Merger changes are addressed in the section on authorisation. As recommended in the Haper Report, the authorisation process and the formal notification process are combined into a single authorisation process which now sits with the ACCC at first instance. Merger authorisation is combined with authorisation for other conduct - there is not a separate authorisatioon process. There is no provision for ex-post review of merger and no proposed establishment of a separate policy body like the proposed Australian Council for Competition Policy. |
Comparison of new law and current law (EM page 42) |
|
Current law |
New law |
'There are separate authorisation provisions applying to mergers and other types of authorisations.' |
'There is a single authorisation provision for all types of authorisations.' |
'The decision-maker at first instance for merger authorisations is the Tribunal.' |
'The decision-maker at first instance for merger authorisations is the Commission.' |
'The Tribunal’s determination on a merger authorisation cannot be appealed.' |
'The Commission’s determination on a merger authorisation can be reviewed by the Tribunal on appeal.' |
Authorisation and notification
Recommendation 38 |
Response |
The authorisation and notification provisions in Part VII of the CCA should be simplified to:
This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. |
Authorisation Simplified - single authorisation provision allowing Commission to authorise otherwise prohibited conduct. Authorisation may be granted if conduct (other than conduct which is per se prohibited) would either not have the effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition or if it would it would be likely to result in a benefit to the public that would outweigh detriment that would or would be likely to result from the conduct. For per se prohibited conduct the public benefit test must be satisfied before authorisation is granted. Formal merger clearance and authorisation processes repealed- mergers subject to same general authorisation process. Notification ACCC can now impose conditions on notifications for collective bargaining and boycotts Collective boycott ACCC given 'stop notice' pwoer to require collective boycott conduct to cease Block exemption See also block exemption below |
Comparison of new law and current law (EM page 42) |
|
Current law |
New law |
'There are separate authorisation provisions applying to mergers and other types of authorisations.' |
'There is a single authorisation provision for all types of authorisations.' |
'The decision-maker at first instance for merger authorisations is the Tribunal.' |
'The decision-maker at first instance for merger authorisations is the Commission.' |
'The Tribunal’s determination on a merger authorisation cannot be appealed.' |
'The Commission’s determination on a merger authorisation can be reviewed by the Tribunal on appeal.' |
'The Commission can only approve or reject notifications.' |
'The Commission may impose conditions on collective boycott and RPM notifications.' |
'There is no provision for a ‘stop notice’.' |
'A collective boycott must cease when the Commission gives a ‘stop notice’ ...' |
Block exemptions
Recommendation 39 |
Response |
A block exemption power, exercisable by the ACCC, should be introduced and operate alongside the authorisation and notification frameworks in Part VII of the CCA. This power would enable the ACCC to create safe harbours, where conduct or categories of conduct are unlikely to raise competition concerns, on the same basis as the test proposed by the Panel for authorisations and notifications (see Recommendation 38). The ACCC should also maintain a public register of all block exemptions, including those no longer in force. The decision to issue a block exemption would be reviewable by the Australian Competition Tribunal. The Panel’s recommended form of block exemption power is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. |
New 'class exemption' power allows Commission to exempt categories of conduct. Pursuant to s 95AA the Commission must be satisfied the conduct would not have the effect or be likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition or the conduct must result or be likely to result in a benefit to the public outweighing the detriment that would or would be likely to result from the conduct. |
Comparison of new law and current law |
|
Current law | New law |
There is no block/class exemption power | There is a class exemption power. |
Private actions
Harper Recommendation 41 |
Exposure Draft bill |
Section 83 of the CCA should be amended so that it extends to admissions of fact made by the person against whom the proceedings are brought in addition to findings of fact made by the court. This recommendation is reflected in the model legislative provisions in Appendix A. |
Admissions of fact or findings of fact may be used in other proceedings Current section 83 repealed and replaced to facilitate this - changes only relate to findings of fact and admissions of fact made after commencement of the new section. |
Comparison of new law and current law |
|
Current law |
New law |
'Findings of fact made by a court against a person may be used in other proceedings against that person under the Act.' |
'Admissions of fact made by a person, or findings of fact made by a court, in certain proceedings may be used in certain other proceedings against that person under the Act.' |
Access regime
Harper Recommendation 42 |
Exposure Draft Bill |
The declaration criteria in Part IIIA of the CCA should be targeted to ensure that third-party access only be mandated where it is in the public interest. To that end:
The Competition Principles Agreement should be updated to reflect the revised declaration criteria. The Australian Competition Tribunal should be empowered to undertake a merits review of access decisions, while maintaining suitable statutory time limits for the review process. |
Part IIIA amended to
A new meaning of declaration criteria is inserted into s 44CA of the Act and the current s 44H is repealed and substituted with:
The changes to the criteria are:
sub-section (e) has been removed (dealing with the service already being the subject of an effective access regime). |
Comparison of new law and current law (pp 77-78) |
|
Current law |
New law |
'The declaration criteria that must be considered by the Council and Minister are replicated across multiple sections.' |
'The declaration criteria that must be considered by the Council and Minister are contained in a single section.' |
'Declaration criterion (a) requires the decision maker to consider whether access (or increased access) would promote a material increase in competition.' |
'The decision maker must consider whether access (or increased access) on reasonable terms and conditions following declaration would promote a material increase in competition.' |
'The decision maker must consider whether it is uneconomical for anyone to develop another facility to provide the service.' |
'The decision maker must consider whether total foreseeable market demand could be met by the facility at least cost.' |
'The decision maker must consider whether the facility is of national significance, having regard to its size, importance to constitutional trade or commerce and to the national economy.' |
'No change.' |
'The decision maker must consider whether access (or increased access) would be contrary to the public interest.' |
'The decision maker must consider whether access (or increased access) would promote the public interest.' |
'The decision maker must consider whether the service is subject to an effective access regime as part of the declaration criteria.' |
'The decision maker does not need to consider an application by an access seeker or access recommendation respectively if the regime is subject to an effective access regime.' |
'No equivalent.' |
'The Minister may revoke the certification on recommendation by the Council, if the regime ceases to be effective. The Council may make a recommendation on its own initiative or on application.' |
'The Commission’s power to make a determination requiring a facility operator to extend or expand the facility, and the safeguards on that power, relate to ‘expansions’, ‘extensions’ and ‘extending’ the facility.' |
'The Commission’s power to make a determination requiring a facility operator to extend or expand the facility, and the safeguards on that power, are amended to include capacity and geographical expansions.' |
'If the Minister does not publish a decision on a declaration within the 60 day time limit, they are taken to have accepted the Council’s recommendation.' |
'If the Minister does not publish a decision on a declaration within the 60 day time limit, they are taken to have not made a declaration.' |
Power to obtain information, documents and evidence
Harper Recommendation 40 |
Exposure Draft Bill |
The section 155 power should be extended to cover the investigation of alleged contraventions of court-enforceable undertakings. The ACCC should review its guidelines on section 155 notices having regard to the increasing burden imposed by notices in the digital age. Section 155 should be amended so that it is a defence to a ‘refusal or failure to comply with a notice’ under paragraph 155(5)(a) of the CCA that a recipient of a notice under paragraph 155(1)(b) can demonstrate that a reasonable search was undertaken in order to comply with the notice. The fine for non-compliance with section 155 of the CCA should be increased in line with similar notice-based evidence-gathering powers in the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001. |
The section 155 power is extended to cover the investigation of alleged contraventions of court-enforceable undertakings. A 'reasonable search' defence is introduced. The fine for non-compliance is increased. |
Comparison of new law and current law (p 72) |
|
Current law |
New law |
'If a person has refused or failed to comply with a notice to produce documents it is not a defence if the person has undertaken a reasonable search for those documents.' |
'If a person has refused or failed to comply with a notice to produce documents it is a defence if the person has undertaken a reasonable search for those documents.' |
'A section 155 notice may not be issued in relation to alleged contraventions of court-enforceable undertakings.' |
'A section 155 notice may be issued in relation to alleged contraventions of court-enforceable undertakings.' |
The maximum penalty for non-compliance with a section 155 notice is 20 penalty units or 12 months imprisonment (for an individual).' |
'The maximum penalty for non-compliance with a section 155 notice is 100 penalty units or 2 years imprisonment (for an individual).' |
Secondary boycotts
Harper Recommendation 36 |
Exposure Draft Bill |
The prohibitions on secondary boycotts in sections 45D-45DE of the CCA should be maintained and effectively enforced. The ACCC should pursue secondary boycott cases with increased vigour, comparable to that which it applies in pursuing other contraventions of the competition law. It should also publish in its annual report the number of complaints made to it in respect of different parts of the CCA, including secondary boycott conduct and the number of such matters investigated and resolved each year. The maximum penalty level for secondary boycotts should be the same as that applying to other breaches of the competition law. |
Maximum penalty increased to align with other competition law breaches. |
Comparison of new law and current law (p 32) |
|
Current law |
New law |
'The maximum penalty for a breach of the secondary boycott provisions is $750,000.' |
'The maximum penalty for a breach of the secondary boycott provisions is the greatest of:
|
Competition law simplification
Harper Recommendation 23 |
Exposure Draft Bill |
The competition law provisions of the CCA should be simplified, including by removing overly specified provisions and redundant provisions. The process of simplifying the CCA should involve public consultation. Provisions that should be removed include:
|
Section 45(1) concerning contracts made before 1977 was repealed. A definition of contract was added which includes a covenants with the result that duplicate and redundant provisions relating to covenants could be repealed. |
Comparison of new law and current law (p 28) |
|
Current law |
New law |
'Contract is not defined.' |
'Contract is defined.' |
'Contract is not defined and the Act separately refers to contracts and covenants throughout.' |
'The definition of contract includes a covenant.' |
'Party, to an arrangement that is a covenant, is not defined.' |
'Party, to an arrangement that is a covenant, is defined, to include a person bound by or entitled to the benefit of a covenant.' |
'Covenants affecting competition are provided for under separate provisions in the law.' |
'Covenants are specifically included within the meaning of ‘contract’.' |
Consultation
Consultation on the Bill will take place until 30 September 2016.
Specific questions
The consultation page includes a set of specific questions for consideration (PDF). They are:
Schedule 2, Cartels
The Exposure Draft includes amendments that would widen the current exceptions in the cartels provisions to better account for legitimate commercial activity, while retaining the prohibition on collusive behaviour between actual or likely competitors involving bid rigging, price fixing, market allocation and/or agreements to restrict supply or acquisition.
1. Joint ventures are exempt from per se liability for cartel conduct through sections 44ZZRO and 44ZZRP. In this context, is the definition of joint venture activity (in section 4J) appropriate or should such activity be more narrowly defined?
2. Does the proposed drafting of section 44ZZRS appropriately limit the exception to the cartels provisions to supply arrangements which are genuinely vertical, and exclude arrangements which are between actual or likely competitors?
a. If not, how could the exception be changed to ensure only vertical arrangements are captured?
3. With the proposed repeal of the definition of ‘likely’ from section 44ZZRB, is the court’s interpretation of ‘likely’ in relation to other parts of the Act sufficiently clear to inform expectations in relation to the cartels provisions?
Schedule 5, Covenants affecting competition
4. With the proposed repeal of sections 45B and 45C, and the repeal and replacement of subsection 45(1), are there contracts still in effect which rely on the operation of paragraph 87(3)(a) for variation, or could the subsection be repealed in its entirety?
Schedule 10, Authorisations, notifications and class exemptions
5. Is there a need for the ACCC’s decision to issue a stop notice to be reviewable by the Tribunal (separate from any review relating to a draft objection or conditions notice), or is it sufficient that the stop notice is in place for a limited period of time?
6. With the proposed repeal of Division 3 of Part VII of the Act (merger clearances and authorisations) and the consolidation of the various clearance and authorisations processes, have all the appropriate considerations for authorisations been included or is there a need for some of the repealed provisions to be reintroduced elsewhere?
Schedule 13, Access to services
7. Are further consequential amendments required to give effect to the proposed changes?
8. Are additional transitional arrangements necessary for existing certifications?
9. Are additional amendments necessary to address matters that have come to light since the release of the Productivity Commission’s 2013 Inquiry into the National Access Regime?
ACCC parallel consultation
The ACCC has set up two consultation hubs in relation to its proposed framework for dealing with two key recommendations contained in the Exposure Draft Bill.
- Draft framework for misuse of market power guidelines
- Draft framework for concerted practices guidelines
The ACCC's consultation runs from 5 September until 3 October.
Media and commentary
Press release
Law firm updates
Barton/Deakin, 'Competition Law Exposure Draft release' (5 September 2016) (PDF)
HopgoodGanim, 'Treasurer's full bench press on misuse of market power' (6 September 2016)
Jones Day, 'Australia's Competition Law Overhaul' (Kluwer Competition Law Blog, 30 September 2016)
Opinion
Media
'Scott Morrison releases draft of competition law reforms' (The Australian, 5 September 2016)
Misa Han, 'Grocery prices could rise under effects test, says Labor' (AFR, 5 September 2016)
Kylar Loussikian, 'Competition law strengthened' (The Australian, 5 September 2016)
Joanna Mather, 'Effects test to stifle bank competition, experts say' (AFR, 2 October 2016)
Joanna Mather, 'Turnbull government introduces 'effects test' bill (AFR, 4 September 2016)